It seems that in addition to our argument for the incompatibility of metaphysical freedom and Hot Heather determinism, we have an argument for the incompatibility of metaphysical freedom and indeteminism. But the world must be either deterministic or indeterministic. It follows that, unless one A the two arguments contains some sex logical error or proceeds from a false premise, metaphysical freedom must be a contradiction in terms, as much an impossibility as a round square or a liquid wine bottle. We may in fact define the problem of metaphysical hotheather freedom as the problem of discovering whether either of the two arguments is defective, and of locating the defect or defects.
But if we know that we are free — indeed, if we are free and do not know it — , there is some defect in one or both of our two arguments. Either there is something wrong with hotheathe skinny teen argument for the conclusion that metaphysical freedom is incompatible with determinism or there is something wrong with our argument for the conclusion that metaphysical freedom is incompatible with indeterminism — or there is something wrong with both
arguments. But which argument is wrong, and why? I do not know. I think no one knows. |
